The goal of this paper is to examine the association between product market competition and corporate investment decisions on particularly, Over investment and low investment. The managers have different incentives to keep cash in firms. Product market competition is another powerful mechanism ensuring that management does not waste resources. When competition exists, shareholders can observe performance in other firms and use this information as a benchmark to evaluate managers. The aim of this research is to investigate impact of product market competition and Interactive relationship between product market competition and free cash flow on Over- investment and low- investment in free cash flow. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index was used as measures of competitiveness. The sample consisted of 110 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange from 10 different industries Over the period 2010 to 2015. Research findings indicate that there is no significant positive relationship between Herfindahl-Hirschman with the low_ investment and Over_ investment. The interactive effect of product market competition on a negative free cash flow has significant relationship with low investment.

Objective: One of the most important decisions managers should take and one of the crucial components of every business unit operation is financing. Managers have the control Over choosing the resource of financing and compared with external financing, internal financing is much easier for them. Choosing the optimal financing policy by managers plays an important role in risk and wealth creation for shareholders. Manager’ s Over confidence is an important behavioual characteristic that affect the way managers invest, finance and decide on dividend policies. Managers prefer internal financing Over external financing because they have more control on internal resources and then, when this is combined with risk-taking behavior of Over confident managers they can affect the investment efficiency since they may stray from the optimal level of investment. On the other hand, if managers feel that corporate gOvernance mechanisms constraint them or they have insufficient internal resources for investing, they may be reluctant to invest. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between management Over-confidence, internal financing and investment efficiency. Method: This is an applied reseach and it is a quasi-emprical research and its methodology is post-event research. This research investigates the real data of firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) and because of that its results are generalizable to the research population. In this research we have used systematic elimination method to chose the research sample. In order to test the research hypothesis, time priod of 2012 to 2018 were chosen and the multivariate regression model by combined data method was used obtain the results. Data from 188 firms were analyzed and we used Microsoft Excel and Eviews version 9 to analyze the data and extract research results. Results: The results of testing research hypotheses show that there is a negative significant relationship between internal financing and investment efficiency. It can be said that the benefits of internal financing has decreased the efficiency of firms’ investment, an example of this benefits is the availability of internal resources. This availability cause managers to violate the optimum level of investment (Over-invest or under-invest in projects). Also, there is a negative relationship between internal financing and Over-investment and a positive relation between internal financing and under-investment. Putting into another words, in firms with under-investment, the level of internal financing is higher and the amount of external resources for financing decreases. So, the internal financing is one of the reasons we have underinvestment in firms. In addition, taking together the effects of management Over confidence and internal financing, investment efficiency decreases. This results are consistent with research theoretical literature. In contrast to internal financing, external financing creates some limitations for managers and because of that managers are reluctant to finance through external resources. So, this is why the revel of investment strays form its optimum level. This results are in line with He et al (2019), Taghizade Khanqah & Badavar Nahandi (2020) and Faraji et al (2019). Conclusion: Internal financing is a factor that affect under-investment positively. So, based on managers control Over internal resources and their concern about valuation of their firm by market, it is evident that they prefer to face minimally with control mechanisms and external regulation. In addition, it can be said that, it is not always for the best interest of firm and its shareholders to have a high degree of internal financing. Therefore stockholders should consider this in their analysis. Putting constraints on the level of internal financing (based on its effect on the level of investment by managers) by stake holders can affect the return of firm considerably. Also, the relationship between use of internal financing and the level of investment by managers and their Over-confidence may be a two-way relationship. With an increase in the use of internal financing and the decreasion of Over-investment and increasion of under-investment, the predicted income of projects and the firm in total may be decreased, that in this case the Over-confidence of managers will in turn decrease again.

The financial anomalies, which have brought about challenges for the nature of efficient-market hypothesis, provide ample experimental evidence on the deviation of market from rationality. According to the efficient-market hy-pothesis, investors avail themselves of all the information available in the market, and then attempt a thorough and painstaking interpretation of it. The empirical evidence, however, reveals that most investors fail to imple-ment rigorous information processing, thereby rendering to a number of behavioral theories concerning market inefficiency and biased information processing. The current research sets out to identify and scrutinize the im-pact of the CEO’s perceptual biases in judgment and economic decision-making on the reporting quality of the firms listed on the Tehran Stock Ex-change. The Purpose of this study CEO Overconfidence and Overinvestment by Role of Economic moderators Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). One hun-dred five companies were selected as the sample size by systematic removal sampling reviewed in 2012-2019. Due to its dichotomous dependent variable, this study uses probit regression to test the research hypotheses. The results indicated the significant positive effect of CEO Overconfidence on Overin-vestment. It was also noted that Exchange Rate strengthens the positive effect of CEO Overconfidence on Overinvestment. Based on these results, the CEO's decisions as a decision-maker in charge of any company, especially under inflationary conditions, can play a substantial role in future corporate investment levels. The findings reveal that the indices of the CEO’s percep-tual biases in judgment and economic decision-making exert a significantly negative effect on financial reporting reliability and competitiveness.

The purpose of this research is investigation the relationship between conservatism and new investment; In addition, this research assessed the impact of investment inefficiency on the relationship between conservatism and new investment. Conservatism is measured based on the pattern presented by Givoly and Hayn (2000). Also, Over investment is considered as a proxy of investment inefficiency which is measured based on the model proposed by Biddle et al (2009). So, research population includes 216 firms listed in Tehran Securities & Exchange Over the period 2012-2017 which selected through filtering method. The hypotheses analyzed through multivariable regression models based on panel data and fixed effect method. The results showed that conservatism had significant and negative impact on new investment. Also, Over investment as a proxy of investment inefficiency had significant and positive impact on new investment. However, conservatism had no significant impact on the relationship between prior Over investment and new investment.

Due to the stochastic nature of wind energy, allocating an appropriate investment incentive for wind generation technology (WGT) is a complicated issue. We propose an improvement on the traditional incentive, known as capacity payment mechanism (CPM), to reward the wind generators based on their performance exogenously affected by the wind energy potential of the location where the turbines are installed, and therefore, lead the investments towards locations with more generation potential. In CPM, a part of investment cost of each generator is recOvered through fixed payments. However, in our proposal, wind generators are rewarded according to dynamic forecasts of the wind energy potential of the wind farm where they are located. We use an auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) model to forecast the wind speed fluctuations in long-term while capturing the auto-correlation of wind velocity variation in consecutive time intervals. Using the system dynamics (SD) modelling approach a competitive electricity market is designed to examine the efficiency of the proposed incentive. Performing a simulation analysis, we conclude that while a fixed CPM for wind generation can decrease the loss of load durations and average prices in long-term, the proposed improvement can provide quite similar results more efficiently.

Earnings forecast accuracy can affect investment efficiency. We expect that an increase in earnings forecast accuracy will result in an increase in investment efficiency and a decrease in both Over-investment and under-investment. The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between management earnings forecast accuracy and investment efficiency. Following the literature, we use the deviation from the expected level of investment considering the growth opportunities, as the measure of investment efficiency. To examine the hypotheses, we identify a sample of 133 firms listed on Tehran Securities and Stock Exchange during the period of 2009-2013.Regression analysis is used to examine the hypotheses and 10 control variables (size, ROA, Tobin’s Q, sales growth, leverage, stock return, forecast horizon, stdev. Stock returns, stdev. ROA and stdev. I) are used in the regression models. Findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between earnings forecast accuracy and investment efficiency and there is a negative relationship between earnings forecast accuracy and Over-investment. In case of under-investment the relation is not strong. The results of examining hypotheses indicate that an increase in earnings forecast accuracy results in an increase in investment efficiency and a decrease in Over-investment. Regarding the under-investment, no strong relation was found between earnings forecast accuracy an under-investment.

This research analyzed the impact of debt maturity and financial reporting quality on under-Over investment. investment inefficiency (under-Over) is measured based on the model presented by Biddle et al (2009) and financial reporting quality is measured based on the model presented by Dechow & Dichev (2002). The research sample includes 219 companies listed in Tehran Securities and Exchange Over the period 2010-2014. Results showed that financial reporting quality and short debt maturity have significant and negative impact on investment inefficiency. These analyzing also have done in two categories such as Over investment observations and under investment observations. Results suggested that financial reporting quality has significantly negative impact on Over investment, but no impact on under investment. Short term debt maturity has no significant impact on Over investment and under investment. Other results showed operational cash flow, tangibility and volatility in operational cash flow have significant and positive impact on Over investment; sales volatility has significant and negative impact on Over investment. But age, growth opportunity, loss and size have no significant impact on Over investment. Also, size has significant and positive impact on under investment; growth opportunity and tangibility have significant and negative impact on under investment. But age, operational cash flow, loss, sales volatility and volatility in operational cash flow have no significant impact on under investment.

Purpose: Novice runners are at high risk of running-related injuries. However, their injury mechanisms are less well understood. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of running-induced fatigue on foot roll-Over pattern in novice runners.Methods: Eighteen (12 male and 6 female) novice runners participated in this study. Before and after the fatigue, plantar load distribution was recorded by Footscan system. Peak plantar pressure, peak force underneath of each zone and Medio-lateral force distribution ratio were calculated during forefoot push-off phase. Furthermore, temporal data such as time to peak force for each region and duration percent for each phase were calculated.Results: After the fatigue, an increase in forefoot and midfoot loading was observed. Results showed statistically significant reduction in the Medio-lateral force distribution ratio in forefoot push off (p=0.029). MoreOver, timing percent of initial contact phase and forefoot contact phase were decreased (p=0.001 and p=0.009 respectively) and percent of forefoot push off phase duration was increased significantly (p=0.036). Time to peak force in the 4th metatarsal reduced.Conclusion: The findings of the present study demonstrated that running-induced fatigue caused load and plantar pressure distribution consequently, roll-Over deviations in novice runners. These results may provide useful information related to several running related injuries.